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Abstract 
 
This paper reports on findings from an ongoing 
study of recent software applications that attempt to 
turn mobile ICT’s into political tools. The software in 
question endeavors to make new types of political 
behavior expressible for ICT users. Two troubling 
trends were found. The first involves 
incommensurability between backend databases and 
the data traces generated by users. The second 
involves the production of data and metadata 
vulnerabilities. As part of discussing these trends, the 
authors introduce the idea of “minor apps” and 
argue for their importance within discussions of 
sociotechnical aspects of digital infrastructure. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper shares findings from a recent study of 
software applications that were principally designed 
for use on mobile ICTs: information and 
communication technologies scaled for portability, 
such as smartphones and tablets that run mobile 
operating systems like Android, BlackBerry OS, iOS, 
Nokia X or Tizen. Mobile ICTs support factory-
installed or user-downloaded “apps” (i.e., software 
applications) that leverage the device’s size, location, 
hardware functions (e.g., camera, audio, memory), 
and commercial wireless networks to enable new 
forms of human communication, public sociality, 
engagement with space and place, and new forms of 
being in the world (immersed, augmented). Such 
devices and the software that runs on them, as we 
highlight in this paper, have also begun to enable new 
forms of political behavior that have little 
resemblance to the famous cases of Occupy Wall 
Street and Arab Spring [7], which played such a key 
role in demonstrating the political potential of ICTs 
but as historical events are increasingly distant from 
the digital and data infrastructures of our current 
moment. 
Mobile ICTs are spreading (i.e., achieving 
technological saturation) and diversifying at a rate 
previously unwitnessed in human history. No other 
documented technology of which we know has 
moved so quickly into so many hands and cultures, 
but also taken such a variety of slightly different 
forms and capabilities while doing so. By the end of 
2015, there were reported to be over 7 billion mobile 
cellular subscriptions in the world. In addition, the 
International Telecommunications Union estimates 
that there will be approximately 6.1 billion 
smartphones in the world by 2020, which is also 
when we expect to see 5th generation (5G) mobile 
networks in place, whose creators are promising 
faster data transmission rates, increased coverage, 
and more [11].  
How mobile subscriptions are counted is a topic 
of ongoing controversy because what actually gets 
counted in such reports are SIM connections and not 
unique human subscribers. Similarly, what counts as 
a smartphone is not typically well-defined in 
estimates of smartphones. Nonetheless, it has become 
incontrovertible that mobile ICTs and their “apps” 
are now a key part of our digital and data 
infrastructures, not only here in Hawaii but also 
globally [11]. The published numbers, although not 
wholly accurate, are themselves further proof: how 
mobile ICTs are not yet countable in precise and 
sophisticated ways is a testament to the pace of their 
creation, spread, and permutation.  
Because of these developments, studies of mobile 
ICTs and the software created for them can follow a 
number of different research paths. Our research 
concentrates on recent efforts to develop apps that 
allow people to express their political views in new 
ways or that allow people to engage in political 
struggle in ways that were not previously doable, 
perhaps even as recently as 2010 or 2012. We study 
efforts to turn current-generation mobile devices into 
political tools, and we try to keep our attention 
focused on the very latest happenings in this domain. 
In doing so, we track new mobile hardware and 
software as it gets developed and released, study the 
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social impact of mobile technologies, and study the 
ways in which existing patterns of human culture and 
behavior inform the creation and use of mobile ICTs. 
Within this broader research agenda, we maintain a 
particular focus on new and emerging enactments of 
political behavior that directly involve the 
operationalization of mobile devices like 
smartphones and tablets.  
All mobile devices are “political tools” to some 
degree, one could argue. For example, such devices 
are typically bound up with controversial processes 
of natural resource extraction (mining for coltan, 
copper, iron, nickel, tungsten, etc.); imbricated within 
global supply chains that mobilize alienated labor; 
and popularly understood only through the veneer of 
advertising strategies that are created by experts in 
fields like consumer behavior and marketing 
psychology [3] to purposefully shape public beliefs 
and sentiments [6]. Such devices are also bound up 
with sexed, gendered and racialized cultures of 
hardware and software engineering that continue to 
be male-dominated and majority-white, at least in the 
United States, which is where we focus the bulk of 
our research attention.  
Each of these topics warrants careful study and 
further attention. But our research specifically 
focuses on how mobile devices allow users to create 
new political possibilities for themselves in real time: 
different ways of being in the world, different ways 
of being socially situated, and different ways of 
engaging with uneven distributions of resources, risk, 
opportunity, and power. Our larger goal is to 
understand how digital platforms and infrastructures 
are sites of political interaction today, starting with 
the idea that such interactions have the potential to 
change quickly given the current rate of technological 
saturation and diversification in the domain of mobile 
ICTs.  
This research on mobile ICTs and our 
mobilization of the term political tools builds directly 
on the sizable (and still-growing) body of academic 
literature that explores the fascinating and multi-
layered links between everyday political culture and 
digital media [4, 13, 18]. Our work also draws 
inspiration from the growing body of research that 
looks at the use of mobile ICTs within social 
movements [9, 10, 16]. These bodies of scholarship 
have accomplished several things that continue to be 
foundational to our own work: justifying mobile 
ICT’s as a valid object of academic study; 
establishing that digital and data infrastructures are 
increasingly entangled with political cultures; and 
making discussable the links between hardware, 
software, information systems, information services, 
and quotidian political behavior.  
Our research adds to this exciting body of work 
by shifting some of the empirical attention to “minor” 
apps that lack large developer teams, large user 
communities, high levels of financing, and/or 
discernible plans for maintenance and sustainability. 
Much of the published research, at least so far, 
focuses on engagements with ICTs that mobilize 
large user communities (e.g., Twitter or Instagram) 
and rely upon a high path dependency on cloud 
computing and networked platforms for web-based 
databases and storage (for example, Gmail or 
Facebook). In these cases, the apps in question 
typically force the users to access data on a web-
based client instead of access data on their internal 
storage, and further, such apps typically encourage 
users to let the software continuously run in the 
background of their mobile devices and passively 
collect new data such as recent pictures or one’s 
current location. Such major apps facilitate a 
captivating range of political behaviors and will 
almost certainly continue to do so.  
We wondered, though, about the thousands of 
apps that are developed and published or sold that 
don’t aim to have millions of downloads but are only 
intended for tens or hundreds of downloads at best. In 
fact, most apps arguably fit on a matrix of at least 
two axes (see Figure 1.), where one axis moves from 
mainstream to niche user communities. The other 
axis concerns where data is collected and stored (i.e., 
what is done with data). In our research, we have 
begun to explore apps that aim to support or service 
niche user communities and on apps that encourage 
users to leverage the internal storage on their devices.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Matrix of users and data storage 
 
As we’re discovering in our work, which is ongoing 
and exploratory, and as we discuss in further detail 
below, much of the software in this other quadrant 
(what we call “minor apps”) seems to work as little 
more than a rudimentary pairing of databases and 
data traces: the software lacks much of the 
functionality and ‘app-iness’ that current generation 
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ICT users would normatively expect with regard to 
features, look, and feel (user interface). However, we 
argue that some provocative developments are 
nonetheless occurring when it comes to people’s 
political behavior and when it comes to the idea of 
using mobile devices as political tools. 
 
2. Method and Design  
 
The paper unfolds in the following manner: we 
begin by further elaborating on the idea of minor 
apps and argue for their importance as objects of 
study for those interested in the “complicated 
relationship” [14] that people have with mobile ICTs. 
We then detail some of our latest research findings, 
focusing on 6 of the apps that we’ve been 
investigating among a larger body (N=18). All 6 are 
English-language examples from the United States, 
an acknowledged limitation of our work. Another 
limitation: we chose to limit our discussion here to 
mobile apps that are available free of cost and 
developed for Android and iOS, two of the most 
popular and accessible mobile operating systems for 
users of smartphones and for developers designing 
and publishing apps [15]. Following the section on 
minor apps, we focus on some of the glitches and 
limitations that we’ve been discovering by analyzing 
the data traces generated by minor apps, how the 
apps utilize databases, and issues of metadata 
creation. We conclude the paper with a discussion of 
why this research matters to those concerned with the 
sociotechnical aspects of digital infrastructure and 
sketch some directions of future research.   
The apps that we discuss in this paper include the 
following: Flyrights, an app geared toward the Sikh 
community that promises to document and map 
incidents of discrimination or profiling at airport 
checkpoints managed by the U.S. Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA); Testee, an app 
primarily geared toward “millennials” that allows 
users to share STD/STI test results in a Snapchat-like 
fashion, with a promise to immediately delete the 
records, as a way to promote sexual frankness and to 
disrupt cultural legacies of shaming around sex 
(many of which are heteronormative legacies, in 
addition to being anti-sex); RedLightTraffic, an app 
that allows users to report suspected incidents of 
human trafficking that works like a citizen law 
enforcement tool for curbing sexual slavery and 
contemporary articulations of sexualized slave labor; 
Hinder, a Tinder parody app that promises to expose 
anti-abortion and “anti-women” politicians and 
government officials; and We-Consent, an app that 
allows users to create a video record of one’s 
affirmative consent to sexual activity, just before 
having sex, as a way to push back on and challenge 
American rape cultures. Each of the 6 apps discussed 
in this paper is a minor app with limited functionality 
and a relatively small user community.  
Much of our research and discussion is grounded 
in data trace analysis.  This kind of data trace analysis 
represents a methodological innovation for 
information and communication scholars grappling 
with the rapid updates and near-constant terms of 
service (ToS) changes found in contemporary mobile 
ICTs and networked platforms. Much of our research 
and discussion also builds on methodological and 
empirical research trends circulated at HICSS 
specifically, which as a scholarly community has 
become one of the principal sites of methodological 
innovation when it comes to critically investigating 
digital and data infrastructures.  
 
3. What is a minor app?  
 
Apps are software applications that run on mobile 
operating systems. Apps also leverage device 
capabilities and access commercial wireless networks 
that connect users to the internet. A number of apps 
come pre-installed on current-generation mobile 
devices, but most users download them from app 
stores (e.g., Google Play Store and iTunes App 
Store), which are online marketplaces that manage 
and control app consumption patterns and planned 
obsolescence patterns by way of developer guidelines 
and managed distribution channels. It should also be 
noted: the majority of apps developed for and 
distributed through app stores are proprietary 
software. While many are “free” to users, the source 
code cannot usually be changed or modified by users. 
In earlier work, we found that such patterns of 
software production and consumption on the part of 
app stores and mobile device and app developers 
leads to routine software updates and, at times, 
software update unrest on the part of software users 
because developer control over apps and their 
versioning can significantly reorganize and upend 
software user experiences [2]. In other words: we had 
already discovered that apps could be sites of politics 
and political contestation, but we had not considered 
the idea of major and minor apps.  
Part of our delay in realizing the existence of such 
apps (or the generativeness of such distinctions) is 
that apps were not always a prominent aspect of 
mobile ICTs. For example, first-generation mobile 
phones on 2G networks, also known as “feature 
phones,” had only a few functions, such as an address 
book, calendar, and text message client. As mobile 
broadband internet coverage increased with 3G 
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networks, smartphones that connect to the internet 
have increased in production and popularity. 
Consequently, the app market has grown to represent 
a new and interesting distribution model for software. 
Instead of using a traditional file structure (tree-style 
directory format) to access individual files (like .jpeg 
and .mp3), contemporary smartphone operating 
systems rely heavily on downloaded and updateable 
apps that allow users to create and access networked 
databases, typically via cloud infrastructures. As 
compared to feature phones, many of the most 
popular and widely-used smartphone apps today are 
largely designed to transmit data (i.e., push data out 
or pull data down) and not necessarily to create or 
store data internally on the mobile device. Yet this 
change over time is marked by internal diversity: 
fundamental differences are emerging between apps 
and not all “new” apps are necessarily making use of 
current-generation digital and data infrastructures. 
In their groundbreaking research on cultures of 
software development, Christopher Kelty and Seth 
Erickson argue: “Software is neither material nor 
immaterial but durable, entrenched and scaffolded” 
[12]. For Kelty and Erikson, moreover, the study of 
software is also the study of people: the existence of 
software “implies an ecology of users, designers, 
maintainers, as well as organizations and physical 
facilities that must be kept running and made 
durable”. One way, then, of approaching the 
“software app” as an object of study is to think about 
how users of mobile ICTs are always situated within 
a complex social milieu that operates in the 
“background” of any mobile device, often invisible to 
users yet nonetheless co-shaping what is thinkable 
and doable with mobile devices. One must also keep 
in mind the various mobile operating systems, 
competing app markets, and the billions of active 
mobile devices now connected to wireless networks 
which together create a polyphonic range of software 
apps and app experiences that mark slightly different 
technological moments (e.g., 2011, 2014, 2017), 
depending on the creation date and update history, 
and possess different levels of vitality (or 
“durability”).  
In shifting our research attention to minor apps, 
we were initially uncertain as to how such apps might 
differ from or reinforce the patterns of software 
production and use documented by other researchers, 
such as Kelty and Erickson. We were also uncertain 
as to the criteria for calling an app minor. But several 
things became apparent as we began to explore this 
other quadrant of app development and use, and as 
we began to group minor apps together into what we 
argue is a coherent object of study, much like the 
“minor literature” analyzed by Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari [8]. Our working definition of minor 
apps, which we enthusiastically invite others to 
trouble or revise, is that such apps are politically 
unambiguous; uniquely particular in their intended 
audience; developed by or for those who hold 
marginalized positions in society; cannot as 
applications fully capitalize on current hardware and 
software capabilities; and cannot as applications fully 
capitalize on current digital and data infrastructures. 
Minor apps are inelegant but radical in potential. 
They don’t always work as described or intended but 
they mark a fundamental shift in the longer history of 
how ICTs and political culture interoperate, 
something dramatically different from what other 
researchers found in the cases of Occupy Wall Street 
or Arab Spring, to offer two better known examples 
of ICTs intermixing with political behavior.  
 
4. Findings: Some trends in minor apps  
 
One of the major trends that we’re observing 
during our research is something that we began 
calling “glitchbait.” Glitchbait apps oversell what 
they promise to do for users. After one or two uses, 
glitchbait apps become meaningless because they 
don’t offer users updated or tailored information to 
their needs (“junkware” is a similar term used by 
others). The mismatch between most of these bait and 
glitch apps has to do with an incommensurability 
between the data traces that the user would create 
(presumably submit to the developers), and the time 
or space limits of the databases that the app queries to 
match the desired function. 
For example, with Hinder, the profiles of anti-
abortion and “anti-women” politicians and 
government officials are served up in a user’s 
matching stream, like its reference point, Tinder, the 
popular dating app.  The profiles served up to the 
user are based on a user’s location. Users in, say, 
Santa Barbara would initially receive profile matches 
that detail the ideologies or viewpoints of California 
state representatives. But once a user has swiped 
through a small number of “anti-women” (a term 
never fully pinned down or defined) politicians and 
political leaders, California in this scenario, the app 
begins to feed profiles from nearby states without 
notification or without the ability to return to 
California profiles. The user has to swipe through a 
whole database of anti-abortion and “anti-women” 
politicians in the US before getting back to 
California. Admittedly, reality is always more 
complex than any database structure can depict [5], 
but the user’s GPS location information doesn’t 
scope out or limit the stream of possibilities based on 
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location limits for which the app claims to be 
purpose-built, as one would find in other swiping 
apps, such as the more well-known apps Tinder and 
Hinge. In the mobile dating apps that Hinder is based 
on (and parodying), setting location limits and 
targeted radiuses are major design features [17]. 
Because users can, by law, only vote in the state of 
their residence, how the Hinder app fumbles with 
location services, and the physical worldliness of 
mobile ICT’s, means that it starts flooding users with 
potentially irrelevant data.  
FlyRights is another glitchbait app. The app isn’t 
dynamic or reflective of user uploads in real time, nor 
does it appear that the developers are regularly 
submitting incidents of airport profiling. In this case, 
instead of a frontend glitch with accessing the right 
data or database, the app has a backend glitch with 
the systems reporting database, which doesn’t update 
frequently to absorb trace data from users based on 
their new (and ongoing) racial profiling encounters at 
TSA checkpoints. In the case of FlyRights, the 
database of incident reports is perpetually outdated 
and misrepresents the rate and severity of airport 
profiling, the very problem the app aims to empower 
users to help chronicle and combat.  
In both of these cases, the developers seem to be 
struggling to resolve how to achieve each app’s 
central promise. Ineffectively folding in new data 
traces makes each app produce biased or flawed 
results. In each of these cases the “bait” is an app that 
works with up-to-date trace data submitted by users, 
the glitch is that these apps don’t succeed because the 
database is populated with outdated data or with poor 
limits on the data being accessed. 
A second trend that we’re observing in our 
research is evidence that minor apps are creating data 
and metadata traces that have afterlives or secondary 
use applications that may be unknown to users or 
perhaps even to the app developers themselves. 
Certain data traces may serve as “metadata” in one 
context because they provide information about 
people’s activity or behaviors, but they may also 
serve as “data” if they are themselves analyzed in 
other contexts and used as evidence to make a claim 
or argument [1]. For example, the user-generated 
content submitted through RedlightTraffic, Testee, 
and We-Consent produce location data that would 
have been previously difficult to collect. While each 
app’s intended purpose is to create data for storage 
and secure transmission privately, the app delivery 
receipts also appear in download caches of the 
devices themselves, even after they have been 
deleted. In each of these apps, device features are 
harnessed to produce technical information about the 
time, place, and size of any data transmission. These 
technical data are background to the user, but are 
essential to the functioning of each app.  
Often when we download and share our data with 
mobile apps, we “dubiously consent” (sometimes 
called “dubcon” in other contexts) to create metadata 
that will have unknown consequences in the future, 
perhaps even for which the developers themselves 
cannot speculate. Downloading the app from the 
Google Play Store or Apple’s iTunes App store 
creates a record of transaction on the marketplaces as 
well as on the storage directory of the device’s 
operating system. Once users download and begin to 
use each of these apps, there remains a history of 
transmission and timestamp. Dubcon apps such as 
these create metadata with strange afterlives: users 
give consent to create and transmit data, but it 
remains unclear whether they would consent to the 
powerful metadata created as part of the process if 
future use cases of metadata could be known. Just as 
the appearance of a colleague's email address in the 
recent Ashley Madison data dump points to particular 
kinds of use, the existence of Redlight Traffic, 
Testee, and We-Consent on your download cache 
points to speculative use cases of the intent and 
outcome of making use of these apps. Despite their 
up-front (seemingly clear) and functional origins, 
aggregated metadata or metadata taken out of context 
can play different roles for different stakeholders 
within digital and data infrastructures. These 
metadata can become more powerful evidence than 
the content initially created by the user, and in these 
particular cases can be used to track political activity 
and behavior.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The mobile apps that we’ve been examining in 
our research represent some of the edges of digital 
culture and app development. They have niche user 
communities and limited functionality. But each 
seems purpose-built for engaging in expressly 
political behavior. Each tries to make new kinds of 
political behavior afforded, to use the language of 
affordances. Developed for mobile ICTs, the apps try 
to immerse technology into a user’s political life in 
new ways, or to augment a user’s engagement with 
and relationship to pre-existing (and often 
longstanding, embodied) political struggles around 
physical and cultural differences, and around the 
uneven distribution of resources, risk, opportunity, 
and power in society. The user may not have any 
prior relationships with or fluencies in these specific 
political struggles, nor the app developers. That 
makes the apps that we’ve been studying all the more 
fascinating: the links between what we’re calling 
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minor apps and more famous examples of political 
behavior involving digital platforms and 
infrastructures are not immediately clear. In many 
ways, we hope that’s one of the central contributions 
of this paper: shifting the empirical attention and 
calling attention to minor apps as political grounds.  
Two major trends that we’ve been observing in 
our research, which focuses on the United States, are 
the following: (1) a common disconnection between 
the data traces and databases underpinning minor app 
functionality and (2) the active production of data 
vulnerabilities due to how minor apps create and 
store data and metadata traces. As our research 
continues, we intend to look for these trends across a 
greater range of minor apps, which this paper posits 
is a useful term or category of analysis for critically 
talking about sociotechnical aspects of digital 
infrastructure, the focus of our discussion here as we 
elaborate on why this research matters and articulate 
some directions for future research.  
Our research presented here begins to shed light 
on several sociotechnical aspects of the worlds 
underpinning minor app development and 
surrounding minor application use. One possibility is 
that an alternate way of making digital and data 
infrastructure is starting to root into commercial app 
stores and, moreover, doing so despite breaking from 
the normative conventions that mainstream users 
might associate with “good” design practice or app 
development. If that’s the case, minor apps of this 
type could represent a purpose-built materialization 
of political values, a tangible example of “appiness” 
denied on the part of app designers and developers 
who want to create some other form of user 
experience and engagement because they hold an 
alternate perspective on either digital platforms, 
infrastructures, or both. 
A second possibility is that what we’re currently 
reading as troubling trends are in fact manifestations 
of tension between commercial wireless providers 
and minor app developers, between mobile hardware 
makers and minor app developers, or some 
combination thereof (depending on the app in 
question, the nature of the glitches or vulnerabilities, 
and the particular actor groups involved). Informed 
by the research presented here and by ongoing 
discussions at HICSS, we remain open in our 
research to the possibility that what we’re beginning 
to discover is actually a broader set of tensions that 
potentially involve not only a thick social layer but 
also the thick physical layer that comprises 
commercial “wireless” networks and “wireless” 
communications.  
A third possibility is that fundamental skill and 
knowledge gaps exist among those trying to turn 
mobile devices into political tools. Who gets to 
participate in politically experimenting with ICTs, 
and what they know and can do as app designers and 
developers, is almost certainly shaped by pre-existing 
patterns of privilege and opportunity. These examples 
may be cases of limits and limiting factors: “the best 
that can be done” by these particular developer 
communities.  
As we continue to carry out work on what we 
think is an important and understudied topic, what we 
expect to find on the near horizon is not just one or 
two mega-platforms for political behavior but a 
planet populated by a litany of minor apps, for all 
different types of users and political contexts, and for 
all different types of mobile devices. In their current 
instantiation, such tools try to do things like give 
people the situational capacity to add to running, 
open-ended data resources designed for public use or 
push data about specific political causes or allow 
people to create new kinds of records as a way of 
being politically engaged or allow people to find 
politically-charged resources or services. But such 
tools have a level of particularity to them that 
frequent users of major apps would likely find 
unusual, along with a high level of “disfunctionality” 
for lack of a more appropriate term. 
Directions for future research include a broader 
investigation of “appiness” and its denial in existing 
app marketplaces, studies of practice that attend to 
tensions between the actor groups involved in the 
design, production and use of minor apps as well as 
explore if and how such tensions find materialization, 
and investigations of skill and knowledge inequities 
within app developer communities that may be 
limiting what’s thinkable and doable with mobile 
ICTs among those working at the very edges of 
technology-assisted political behavior. 
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